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38 
FROM LAREDO TO FORT WORTH:  
RACE, POLITICS, AND THE TEXAS 
REDISTRICTING CASE 
Ellen D. Katz* † 
LULAC v. Perry held that Texas violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act when it displaced nearly 100,000 Latino residents from a congressional 
district in Laredo to protect the Republican incumbent they refused to sup-
port. At the same time, the Justices let stand the dismantling of a so-called 
“coalition” district in Fort Worth where African-American voters compris-
ing a minority of the district’s population allegedly enjoyed effective control 
in deciding the district’s representative.  
Only Justice Kennedy supported the outcome in both Laredo and Fort 
Worth. His opinion marks the first time that he, or indeed a majority of the 
Justices, has identified a Section 2 violation in a merits case since Congress 
amended the statute in 1982. In so doing, Justice Kennedy posits a distinct 
conception of the role of race in the districting process, one that prohibits 
districts drawn to construct racially-defined political communities as well as 
districts that impair the political power of existing communities. This ap-
proach neither removes race from the decision-making calculus nor tempers 
its prominence, but instead channels its use to designated ends. The ap-
proach differs from that taken by the Chief Justice, who lamented this 
“sordid business, this divvying us by race,” but would have done nothing to 
restrain the institutions most responsible for doing so.  
Justice Kennedy’s opinion also demonstrates both how partisan gerry-
mandering shapes claims under the Voting Rights Act, and how the Act may 
provide a meaningful curb on such gerrymandering. LULAC specifically 
restrains the use of incumbency protection as a districting principle, at least 
insofar as its application dilutes the voting strength of a racial minority. 
More generally, LULAC’s identification of racial vote dilution in Laredo but 
not in Fort Worth suggests a nascent conception of political harm to voters 
regardless of race when a political system is rigged to block competition. In 
other words, LULAC suggests that Justice Kennedy may find within the Vot-
ing Rights Act itself the standard he has been seeking for managing claims 
of partisan gerrymandering. 
                                                                                                                      
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
† Suggested citation: Ellen D. Katz, From Laredo to Fort Worth: Race, Politics, and the 
Texas Redistricting Case, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 38 (2006), 
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/katz.pdf. 
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I. 
LULAC seeks to do away with two types of racially-informed districts. 
The first, long targeted by Justice Kennedy for elimination in cases like Miller 
v. Johnson and Rice v. Cayetano, is a district drawn to create a racially-defined 
political community that would not otherwise exist. That is what Justice Ken-
nedy saw Texas doing in District 25 where it linked Latino voters on the 
Mexican border with those living hundreds of miles away in Austin.  
Texas argued that the Voting Rights Act required the creation of a district 
like District 25 to compensate for the displacement of Latino voters in Laredo. 
What Justice Kennedy saw, however, was a misguided attempt at social engi-
neering that sought to unite “far flung segments of a racial group with 
disparate interests.” Echoing language he has used before, Justice Kennedy 
lamented the State’s failure to respect and to “account for the differences be-
tween people of the same race.” District 25 was simply too vast and the Latino 
voters united there too disparate from one another to let the district stand, at 
least insofar as it was meant to offset what was done in Laredo.  
The Chief Justice rightly pointed out the novelty of Justice Kennedy’s 
specific finding that District 25 was insufficiently compact for purposes of 
Section 2, but the disagreement between the justices transcended this knotty 
doctrinal point. Joined by Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts complained 
that the Court should not be deciding “which mixes of minority voters 
should count,” particularly since the district court had already deemed the 
mix in District 25 appropriate. While the Chief Justice then referenced this 
“sordid business, this divvying us up by race,” he found nothing legally 
wrong with the manner in which Texas divvied up a whole lot of folks by 
race in District 25 and elsewhere. Indeed, he joined the remarkable portion 
of Justice Scalia’s opinion that deemed District 25 an intentional racial ger-
rymander that was nevertheless justified, under strict scrutiny, by what 
Justice Scalia labeled the State’s compelling interest in complying with Sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Justice Kennedy found it unnecessary to reach this issue, but his discus-
sion of District 25 suggests that he disagreed both that the Voting Rights Act 
mandated this district and that Congress could constitutionality so require. 
For Justice Kennedy, the Court had no choice but to require the “rejigger-
ing” of district lines to cure the race essentialism he found manifest in the 
boundaries of District 25. 
Justice Kennedy thought Texas erred, however, not only by aggregating 
Latino voters in District 25 in the manner that it did; he also found the 
State’s effort to divide Latino voters in Laredo problematic. The reason, he 
explained, was that Texas fractured Laredo’s Latino population to impair the 
political power of an existing, cohesive, “politically active” and racially-
defined community. Doing this, Justice Kennedy concluded, diluted Latino 
voting strength and, given the inadequacy of District 25, violated Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act. 
Underlying this holding is the premise that jurisdictions must respect at 
least some existing racially-defined communities when they draw district 
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lines. While Justice Kennedy’s discussion of District 25 explicitly states that 
we must “account for the differences between people of the same race,” his 
invalidation of the Laredo district necessarily implies that we respect their 
similarities as well. Race need not necessarily be a problem to overcome but 
can instead function as a trait that unites people in positive ways and gives rise 
to communities that, at least in certain circumstances, warrant our protection.  
That, of course, may simply be another way of saying that racial vote dilu-
tion is a cognizable harm—hardly a revolutionary proposition. LULAC 
nevertheless makes clear that Justice Kennedy subscribes to it. So apparently 
do the Court’s two newest justices, both of whom declined to join Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, who deny that racial vote dilution is ever something 
courts can effectively remedy. Indeed, the Chief Justice’s opinion suggests he 
would have ordered the reconfiguration of the Laredo district had Texas failed 
to create what he saw as an adequate substitute in District 25.  
To be sure, the Court’s invalidation of the Laredo district arguably rests 
on a narrow reading of the Voting Rights Act. The dispute between Justice 
Kennedy and the Chief Justice on the role of compactness in District 25 may 
produce an additional hurdle for Section 2 plaintiffs, although its magnitude 
is not clear. Of more consequence, LULAC’s focus on discriminatory intent 
suggests the Court’s conception of racial vote dilution may be quite re-
stricted. While Section 2 prohibits electoral practices that impair minority 
political participation regardless of the underlying motivation, Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion specifically noted that the Laredo district “bears the mark of 
intentional discrimination.” If this characterization was critical to the 
Court’s holding, LULAC may in fact do no more than affirm the incontro-
vertible proposition that the State may not intentionally impair minority 
political participation. 
That LULAC does more, however, is suggested by Justice Kennedy’s de-
tailed description of the nature and quality of political participation by 
Laredo’s Latino community and the effect the new boundary had on their 
ability to participate in the political process. Justice Kennedy depicted a 
vibrant community, whose members overcame a long history of discrimina-
tion and were registering and voting in ever-increasing numbers. He 
repeatedly described the community as “politically active” and “cohesive,” 
one that was “poised to elect [its] candidate of choice,” and one whose mo-
bilization was “made fruitless” by a district line drawn through the middle 
of Laredo. 
Justice Kennedy, moreover, resisted the tendency of many lower court 
judges to apply narrowly the factors that comprise the Section 2 inquiry. 
Justice Kennedy did not, for example, discount the importance of past racial 
discrimination in Texas even though many of the State’s Latino residents 
lived outside the U.S. when much of the discriminatory conduct occurred. 
Nor did he view increasing rates of Latino voter registration and turnout as a 
reason to dismiss past discrimination as irrelevant. Justice Kennedy did not 
discount evidence that voting is racially polarized in southwestern Texas 
even though partisanship contributed to Anglo support for (and Latino oppo-
sition to) Laredo Representative Henry Bonilla. Nor did Justice Kennedy 
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reflexively uphold incumbency protection as a legitimate justification for a 
challenged district, instead deeming it a tenuous policy choice because its 
pursuit diluted minority voting strength. Finally, Justice Kennedy labeled 
Representative Bonilla unresponsive to Latino interests based on the simple 
fact that Latino voters did not support him, a novel and expansive measure 
of unresponsiveness that dispenses with the examination of substantive pol-
icy and constituent access that has typically prompted lower courts to 
characterize representatives as responsive.  
This represents a vigorous application of Section 2 in Laredo, one that 
recognizes the right of Latino residents there to mobilize and participate not 
only as individual voters but as a racially-defined, politically active and co-
hesive community.  
II. 
Justice Kennedy seemed more grudging when he assessed a similar, al-
beit distinct Section 2 claim brought by African-Americans in Fort Worth. 
His controlling opinion left open the question whether Section 2 protects 
minority interests in coalition districts, where minority voters comprise less 
than half the electorate but nevertheless control electoral outcomes. Instead, 
Justice Kennedy resolved the Section 2 claim by denying that the Fort Worth 
district dismantled in 2003 had been a true coalition district.  
African-American voters in Fort Worth had constituted a majority of the 
primary electorate in what had been a safely Democratic district. They con-
sistently voted for Martin Frost, an “Anglo Democrat” who repeatedly ran 
unopposed in the primary and represented the district in Congress for nearly 
thirty years. Justice Kennedy concluded, however, that these facts did not 
necessarily make Frost the African-American candidate of choice or estab-
lish that black voters controlled his election. After all, the opinion posits, 
had “an African-American candidate of choice” ever challenged Frost in the 
primary, white and Latino voters might have participated in greater num-
bers. The assumption is that Frost would have prevailed in this 
circumstance, the absence of black support notwithstanding, and conse-
quently, that “Anglo Democrats” necessarily controlled the district. 
Improbable perhaps, but this hypothetical scenario nevertheless captures 
the core reason why we cannot be sure Frost was genuinely minority pre-
ferred. The reason is not that he is white, but rather that he was perennially 
unopposed. The Fort Worth district was not only safely Democratic, it was 
safely Martin Frost’s district, with the absence of competition seeping into 
the primary itself. And, of course, the district was drawn precisely for that 
purpose. As Justice Kennedy properly reminds us, Frost himself was the 
“architect” behind the 1991 Democratic gerrymander to which the Republi-
cans 2003 foray into re-redistricting was largely a response.  
In this sense, Martin Frost was the Democratic Henry Bonilla, and the 
Fort Worth district was the product of the same form of incumbency protec-
tion that Justice Kennedy saw as problematic in Laredo. As a matter of 
formal doctrine, of course, this parallel has no bearing on the question of 
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whether either district gave rise to racial vote dilution. And yet, the role of 
partisan gerrymandering and specifically incumbency protection in the crea-
tion of each district was crucial to Justice Kennedy’s analysis of dilution in 
each location.  
Incumbency protection, as pursued in Laredo, destroyed what made the 
Latino community there worth protecting—hence, Justice Kennedy’s re-
peated references to Laredo’s energetic, cohesive, “politically active” Latino 
community. In Fort Worth, by contrast, incumbency protection prevented the 
district from becoming a forum in which such an engaged community might 
emerge. Indeed, propelling Justice Kennedy’s skepticism that African-
American voters truly preferred Frost is the conviction that the Fort Worth 
district, created by Martin Frost for Martin Frost, was not an environment in 
which a meaningful preference for a political candidate could be expressed 
and, consequently, where a vibrant political community could arise and 
flourish. 
Justice Kennedy deemed the effort to insulate Bonilla flawed because it 
was meant “to benefit the officeholder, not the voters,” and he likely thought 
Fort Worth was no different. This distinction between benefits to voters and 
those to officeholders is underdeveloped, but the suggestion seems to be that 
incumbency protection should promote responsiveness rather than stifle 
competition. That’s an intriguing idea, although an approach more easy to 
administer and more robust in effect would be to return to the rule set forth 
in Karcher v. Daggett—the often-cited source of the mantra that incum-
bency protection is a legitimate districting goal.  Karcher itself condoned 
not the protection of incumbents writ large, but instead the far more re-
stricted desire to draw district lines so as to avoid contests between 
incumbents. 
As formulated in LULAC, Justice Kennedy’s distinction between good 
and bad forms of incumbency protection precludes some manifestations of 
the practice, at least insofar as they cause racial vote dilution. But the opin-
ion also hints at the idea that these bad manifestations might be unlawful 
even absent such race-specific harm. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s analysis of 
racial vote dilution in Laredo and Fort Worth begins to define what might 
well be the representational harm that partisan gerrymandering produces 
more generally. When Texas stifled the eager and energized Latino elector-
ate in Laredo, it engaged in a classic form of racial vote dilution. But it also 
stifled competition, doing harm not just to a racially-informed political 
community on the cusp of victory, but to all voters in the district for whom 
vibrant political participation was no longer an option. 
